Usually, U.S. economic statecraft is designed to help American companies succeed abroad. President Donald Trump’s punitive trade program is having the reverse effect. Broad-based import taxes have jolted manufacturers across ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), including American ones.

Rather than checking China, trade policy is alienating regional partners, harming supply-chain diversification, and eroding America’s influence over the bloc’s trade decisions. The U.S. is engaged in what Evan Feigenbaum, a veteran diplomat and former Republican, terms a “reverse pivot.” Bogged down in foreign crises elsewhere, Washington now projects hesitation and retreat in Asia rather than dynamic leadership.

In the months after President Trump’s April 2025 announcement of “Liberation Day” tariffs, some of ASEAN’s non-tariff barriers fell. A few countries used the exogenous threat to bring about needed reforms.  Deals were done, including Boeing sales and–at least prospective–LNG contracts. It appeared that coercion worked, at least in the short term. In February the Supreme Court struck down much of the initial tariff regime and the administration pivoted to workarounds: 150-day emergency measures under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, and expansive Section 301 investigations into forced labor, intellectual property violations, and “excess capacity.” 

America’s labor, intellectual property, and excess-capacity concerns are really about China, not Southeast Asia. The administration substituted an improvised China policy for a coherent Southeast Asia policy—a strategic blunder. By treating regional partners as collateral damage to show that China isn’t singled out, Washington is undercutting its most reliable partners and allies. 

Nowhere is the absurdity of this approach more evident than in the supply chains themselves. For nearly a decade, multinational corporations have redirected capital and manufacturing from China into Vietnam, Malaysia, India, and the Philippines. The goal of these “China plus one” strategies was to insulate critical industries from geopolitical risk and move them into friendly states. 

Washington’s tariff regime now undercuts this strategy. Southeast Asian export hubs suffer far more than the United States when Chinese firms attempt illicit transshipment, while subsidized Chinese overcapacity squeezes local producers. The broader reality, though, is not widespread evasion but deep and legitimate supply-chain integration. By imposing blanket punitive duties, Washington is tightening the vise on the very partners helping achieve that diversification. 

As Deborah Elms, head of trade policy at the Hinrich Foundation, has observed, Washington created the incentive structure for alternate supply routes and is now penalizing regional partners for using them. 

These tariffs aren’t even achieving Trump’s stated goals. Higher costs and a shortage of skilled domestic labor mean production lines won’t magically shift to U.S. shores. Bilateral trade deficits with Southeast Asian economies remain largely unchanged; regional exporters, U.S. importers, and consumers are simply absorbing higher costs. 

ASEAN nations have long been masters of dynamic hedging—exemplified by Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy”—balancing China against the United States. None of them want to be dominated by Beijing, making Washington their natural partner. Yet as U.S. policy grows increasingly erratic and punitive, it inadvertently pushes them to hedge elsewhere. 

As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney warned at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, the weaponization of economic tools forces middle powers to organize: “If we are not at the table, we are on the menu.” 

Coercive tactics failed with Canada, and they will fail in Asia. Recently, politically appointed U.S. ambassador to Singapore Anjani Sinha told local and international business leaders that he received orders from the President to “bring home the money,” so they needed to double their U.S. investments.  The demand went over like a lead balloon. Capital flows are not surging into the United States; they are pivoting further into Asia.

This friction runs counter to decades of bipartisan precedent. Since the 1985 Plaza Accord, which catalyzed an era of industrial integration in Southeast Asia, American leaders have recognized that regional partners thrive under predictable, rules-based frameworks rather than blunt coercion. Today’s transactional posture risks creating a durable trust deficit that will penalize American enterprise for a generation. 

Since America pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in favor of country-by-country negotiations, its absence at the table has been filled by others. ASEAN is now building institutional networks that bypass Washington altogether. Member states are working with accords like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 

American companies have not forgotten the benefits of clear rules of the road in a multilateral context. They have worked closely with ASEAN negotiators toward the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA). Spanning 11 nations, nearly 700 million consumers, and an estimated $2 trillion digital marketplace, DEFA would establish comprehensive standards for cross-border data governance, cybersecurity, digital identity, and artificial intelligence.  

As Washington retreats behind tariffs and procedural disputes, Southeast Asia—with input from U.S. companies—is writing the regulatory architecture of the 21st-century digital economy. 

Washington builds walls while ASEAN builds architecture. 

Southeast Asia does not wish to decouple from the United States. Four ASEAN nations—Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore—rank among America’s top 20 bilateral trading partners. Private enterprise, investment flows, and educational links remain extraordinarily resilient. 

But in statecraft, trust is the ultimate currency. U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific was never sustained through sheer market size or coercive leverage alone; it thrived because Washington offered an institutional vision grounded in mutual benefit and reliable rules. If Washington continues to treat its Asian partners as transactional pawns in a zero-sum struggle with Beijing, it will discover they have other trading partners. America risks economic isolation and strategic diminishment in the century of the Pacific Rim.

The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.

Over the past year, many dividend stocks lost their luster for two reasons. First, higher-growth AI stocks continuously pulled investors away from conservative income stocks. Second, the Fed’s rate hike in September — its first in three years — drove up the yields of safer fixed-income investments and made them more attractive than blue chip dividend stocks.

That pressure might persist through the end of the year, but it’s creating attractive buying opportunities for income investors who plan to hold their dividend stocks for the long term. Let’s look at three dividend stocks that are worth buying with $5,000 (or more) in November: AbbVie (ABBV -2.10%), Johnson & Johnson (JNJ -1.51%), and Medtronic (MDT +1.93%).

AbbVie

AbbVie, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, has raised its dividend annually for 53 consecutive years. That makes it a Dividend King, or a company that has continuously raised its payout for at least 50 consecutive years.

AbbVie’s forward yield of 2.4% might seem low compared to the 10-Year Treasury’s 4.9% yield. However, it still has ample room for future hikes, since it spent only two-thirds of its free cash flow (FCF) on dividends over the past 12 months. It’s also generated a total return of 199% over the past five years, easily beating the S&P 500‘s (^GSPC +0.54%) total return of 77%.

Past performance never guarantees future gains, but AbbVie’s future still looks bright. Over the past few years, it has offset the loss of U.S. exclusivity for Humira, its blockbuster autoimmune drug, by acquiring companies (including Allergan, ImmunoGen, and Cerevel) and ramping up sales of two new immunology drugs, Skyrizi and Rinvoq.

From 2025 to 2028, analysts expect AbbVie’s adjusted EPS to grow at a 22% CAGR. Those are impressive growth rates for a stock that trades at 18 times next year’s earnings.

Johnson & Johnson

Johnson & Johnson is another Dividend King that has raised its payout for 64 consecutive years. It pays only a 2% forward yield, but it spent just 64% of its FCF on dividends over the past 12 months. It also delivered a total return of 89% over the past five years.

Over the past several years, J&J streamlined its massive business by divesting its slower-growth divisions. Today, it operates two main businesses: Innovative Medicine, which sells pharmaceutical products; and MedTech, which sells medical devices.

The Innovative Medicine segment drives most of its growth, and it’s been ramping up its production of new drugs — including Tremfya for autoimmune disorders and Icotye for psoriasis — to offset its loss of U.S. patent exclusivity for Stelara, its blockbuster psoriasis drug. It also owns a diverse portfolio of patent-protected cancer, autoimmune, and cardiopulmonary drugs.

From 2025 to 2028, analysts expect J&J’s adjusted EPS to grow at a 9% CAGR. It’s still reasonably valued at 25 times next year’s earnings, and should remain a popular defensive stock to hold if the broader market pulls back.

Medtronic

Medtronic, one of the world’s top medical device makers, has raised its dividend for 49 consecutive years and is on track to become a Dividend King next year. It pays a forward yield of 3%, and its dividends only consumed 60% of its FCF over the past 12 months.

But over the past five years, Medtronic delivered a negative total return of 5%. Without reinvested dividends, its stock price fell 19%. It struggled with supply chain constraints, inflation, forex headwinds, an uneven recovery in elective procedures post-pandemic, and regulatory challenges in its diabetes unit. It also grappled with quality-control issues and the growing use of GLP-1 drugs, which could throttle demand for certain medical procedures.

However, Medtronic’s future looks a lot brighter. Over the past two fiscal years (which ended in April), its earnings grew again as its component costs normalized, it expanded its higher-growth cardiovascular businesses, and it spun off its diabetes unit as MiniMed (MMED +2.82%).

From fiscal 2026 to fiscal 2029, analysts expect its adjusted EPS to grow at an 8% CAGR. Its stock still looks like a bargain at 15 times next year’s earnings, and it should attract more attention once more investors realize it’s overcoming its previous challenges.