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I Was Underpricing My Houston Rentals by $2,460/Year—A $20 Report Caught It


I own three new-construction rentals in the Houston area. The tenants are good, and until recently my pricing method was one I’d be embarrassed to explain at a BiggerPockets meetup: open a listing website, find a few houses that look close enough, pick a number that feels right.

So I ran an Avail Rent Analysis report on all three and put my gut up against the data. Two houses were priced light, and one was dead-on. Combined, I was $205 a month under what the reports say the market supports. That’s $2,460 a year, about 41 times what the three reports cost.

Some of it went fine. Some of it went the way the 2013 Astros went (IYKYK). Here’s every house, with the real numbers.

How I Set Rent the First Time (and How You Probably Did, Too)

At my last renewal, I raised one house by 5% because my property taxes went up. That’s how I picked the number. Not the market. My tax bill.

I’m not special here. In Avail’s 2026 Independent Landlord Survey, 74.4% of landlords reported that their ownership costs increased, mainly due to taxes and insurance. My tax bill is a fine reason to raise rent. It just has no idea what the house down the street rents for. (Nobody has ever been moved by a landlord’s tax bill, including the landlord.)

My method for setting the original rent wasn’t much better. I’d type my ZIP code into a listing website, filter for three bedrooms, scroll until four or five houses looked kind of like mine, average them, and shave a little off so it leased fast. That has three problems:

  1. You pick your own comps, so you pick the ones that make you feel good. Nobody has ever scrolled through a listing site and thought, “Yep, the one with carpet in the bathroom, that’s my real comp.”
  2. A listing only tells you what somebody hopes to get. The house asking $2,200 might sit for 60 days before the owner caves, and a screenshot won’t show you that part.
  3. Once a good tenant moves in, I stop checking. They renew, I bump the rent a little (or don’t), and a number I picked on a random Tuesday night ends up running the whole deal for years.

Running the Report on All Three Houses

An Avail Rent Analysis report costs $19.99 per property, so $59.97 for my three. Each rental brings in roughly $1,900 to $2,000 a month, or about $64 a day. The whole experiment cost less than one day’s rent on one house. (Hold on to that $64. We’ll see it again.)

You plug in the property, and the six-page report shows up a few minutes later. The estimate runs on RentRange’s valuation software and assumes your house is in about the same shape as the ones around it, so adjust in your head if yours is nicer (or rougher) than others on the block. Page one gives you three numbers:

  • Rent estimate: what the report thinks the house should rent for
  • Confidence score: how sure the report is, based on how much nearby data it had
  • Estimated vacancy: estimated vacancy rate for the county or surrounding area

After that come the benchmarks: 10 nearby comparable rentals on a map, days on market, rent trends by bedroom count, and area gross yield. Avail’s walkthrough explains every chart if you want the full tour.

Want these numbers for your own houses? Run an Avail Rent Analysis report before your next renewal.

My Rent vs. the Estimate vs. the Comps

Here’s each house, ranked by how much the gap hurts:

House

Beds/baths What I charge Avail estimate Confidence 10-comp range

Monthly gap

House 1 (oldest) 4/2 $1,900 $2,050 84% $1,875 to $2,295 $150 under
House 2 3/2 $1,950 $2,010 79% $1,795 to $2,150 $60 under
House 3 (newest) 4/2 $1,995 $1,990 88% $1,850 to $2,200 $5 over
Total $5,845 $6,050 $205 under

That’s $2,460 a year, or about 41 times what the three reports cost. In investor terms, at a 6.5% cap rate, $2,460 of extra annual rent is worth roughly $37,800 of property value. The extra rent adds almost no extra expenses, so nearly all of it drops straight to NOI.

House by House

House 1: The oldest

In new-construction years, “oldest” means it still smells a little like drywall. At 1,850 square feet, it’s also the biggest of the three, and it’s the one I priced first, so it’s had the most time to fall behind. I charge $1,900, or $1.03 a square foot. The report says 2,050 (1.11 a square foot), with an 84% confidence score. Seven of the 10 comps rent for more than I do, and the closest one, 0.3 miles away, gets $2,095.

So that’s $150 a month, or $1,800 a year. It gets worse. House 1 is 150 square feet bigger than House 3 and rents for $95 less. I own both houses. I set both prices. (Cool. Love that for me.)

House 2: Close, but Light

House 2 is the smallest: a 3/2 with 1,500 square feet, built in 2024. I charge $1,950, which is $1.30 a square foot. That looks high next to the other two until you remember that smaller houses almost always rent for more per square foot. (A kitchen costs the same whether it’s attached to 1,500 square feet or 1,850.)

The estimate is $2,010, so the gap is $60. This is the house I bumped 5% at the last renewal, and it’s still light. The comps explained most of it. The four rentals above me were all four-bedrooms, and once I lined up square footage, I was right in the middle of the pack. The zip benchmark still had me $50 under the zip median, though. Small gap, small fix.

House 3: The One I Got Right

The newest of the three: a 4/2 with 1,700 square feet, built in 2025. I charge $1,995, or $1.17 a square foot. The estimate is $1,990. The report says I’m $5 over, and I’ll allow it. I’m counting this as a regular-season Rockets win over the Spurs. Not a ring. Still counts.

This one matters more than it sounds, because it’s how I know the report isn’t just a machine built to tell every landlord to raise rent.

The Four Parts of the Report That Changed My Number

Before real estate, I produced music, and reading this report felt like checking a mix. The estimate on page one is the vocal. Everybody hears it. The reasons it sounds the way it does are in the tracks underneath, and for me, those were four sections.

1. Comps

The report pulls the 10 closest rentals like yours and lists square footage, beds and baths, distance, property type, and current rent, with a map. The report picks them. I don’t. That’s the whole difference from my listing website method.

When I priced House 1 off a listing website, my comps were a handful of three-bedroom homes in an older subdivision about two miles away. I was pricing a four-bedroom off three bedrooms. (In my defense, they had nice yards.) The report’s comps were all within a mile, and most were four-bedroom homes.

Tip: Read the comp list by distance and square footage before you look at price. A house two miles away with 400 more square feet is a different product, even with the same number of bedrooms.

2. Mile-radius and ZIP benchmarks

This chart shows low, medium, and high rents for similar properties within a one-mile radius and across your ZIP code, plus the average Section 8 rent. It’s your floor and your ceiling.

If your rent sits under the radius low, something’s off, and it’s either the house or you. House 1 was $160 under the radius medium. That’s when I stopped arguing with the estimate.

3. Days on market

This county-level chart shows how long similar rentals take to lease, next to the vacancy rate. Avail’s rule of thumb: leasing inside 14 days means a hot market, and 30-plus days means you should temper expectations. My county was running about 41 days, closer to 50 in the winter months and the low 30s in summer.

This section kept me from overreacting. A big jump at renewal only works if the house would re-lease fast at the new number. It also tells you when to push: summer is the busiest moving season, and winter can call for lower rent just to keep vacant time short.

4. Gross yield

Gross yield is annual rent divided by property price. My houses cost roughly $200,000 to $220,000, so at $1,900 to $2,000 a month, that’s about 10% to 12% gross on what I paid. On today’s values, it’s about 10%, against 7.7% for my ZIP in the report. So even on today’s values I beat the neighborhood by more than two points, and all three stay in the portfolio. Yield on what I paid is the number I’d brag about at a meetup. Yield on today’s value is the one I actually use.

What the report can’t tell you

The estimate assumes your house is in about the same shape as the homes around it, so adjust for upgrades or wear. It doesn’t know your tenant, your lease history, or what a turn would cost you. I treat it as a strong second opinion, not a verdict.

What I’m Changing at Renewal

Short version: I’m closing the gap slowly, and I’m done pricing renewals off last year’s number.

House

Now Change New rent vs. estimate
House 1 $1,900 +$75 now, +$75 at the next step $1,975, then $2,050 $75 under, then even
House 2 $1,950 +$50 at the June renewal $2,000 $10 under
House 3 $1,995 No increase $1,995

$5 over

The rules behind those numbers:

  • Run the report 90 days before every renewal. It costs $19.99. One empty day costs me about $64. Not a hard call.
  • Show tenants the comps. My renewal note will list what similar houses within a mile rent for. When the new rent still lands under that, the conversation goes a lot better than “my taxes went up.”
  • Close big gaps over two steps, not one. Raising House 1 the full $150 at once gets me $1,800 a year. If that pushes a good tenant out, one month of vacancy (about $2,000) plus a turn (mine run $2,500 to $3,000) costs $4,500 to $5,000. That wipes out two and a half to almost three years of the raise. I’d rather take $75 now, $75 at the next step, and keep the tenant.
  • Move winter lease ends into summer. House 1’s lease ends in January, which means re-leasing in the slow season if the tenant ever leaves. An 18-month renewal moves the next end date to July, right into peak moving season. Any lease of mine that ends between November and February gets the same offer from now on.
  • Leave good alone. House 3 is $5 over the estimate, and the tenant is great. No increase.

Final Thoughts

A bad tenant calls you at 2 a.m. Bad rent never calls. It just sits there, a little light, every month, until you go looking.

So go looking. Run an Avail Rent Analysis report for each of your rentals before the next renewal. If a house does turn over, Avail lists it free on 23 rental sites and handles screening, the lease, and rent collection from the same account.

Worst case, the report tells you you’re right, and you’re out $20. That’s about a third of one empty day.

Run Avail Rent Analysis reports on your properties.

Pizza Hut Co-Founder Who Started With a $600 Loan Dies at 95


Franchise legend Dan Carney died on November 13 at age 95. Carney co-founded the original Pizza Hut, which grew into one of the world’s largest franchise systems, with 18,642 locations today.

It all started with a magazine article and a $600 loan from his mother. After reading about the growing popularity of a new food sensation called “pizza,” Carney, then 26, and his younger brother, Frank, opened a small pizza joint in Wichita, Kansas, in 1958, CNN reports. It sat on the same corner where their father once ran a grocery store. A year later, the brothers opened their first franchise in Topeka. They expanded overseas in 1970, and in 1977 they sold the chain to PepsiCo for $300 million.

Carney gave franchisees much of the credit. When the original building reopened in 2018 as the Pizza Hut Museum on the Wichita State University campus, he said it honored those who “shared risks and ambition in building a global organization.”

Carney also chaired the Cerebral Palsy Research Foundation of Kansas for more than 50 years. “When you win at something, you owe something back to the community,” he once said.

[INTERVIEW] CEO – Major Changes to LoungePair



Today we welcome back Daniel Kinnoch, CEO of LoungePair. We interview him a couple of times 4 and 5 years ago respectively (2021, 2022). There has been quite a few changes to their service since we last spoke to them. Thank you Daniel for taking the time to catch up. Looking forward to the next time! 

The post [INTERVIEW] CEO – Major Changes to LoungePair appeared first on Pointshogger.

the energy transition and inflation – Bank Underground


Dooho Shin, Danae Kyriakopoulou and Josh Perers Cook

Clean power generation, grid investment and growing electricity demand are changing the sources and transmission of energy inflation. In the UK, electricity has become more important in household spending, while gas continues to play an important role in wholesale electricity prices. The Government is also considering how to reduce the influence of gas prices on electricity bills. Building on recent NGFS work on the macroeconomic and monetary-policy implications of the transition, this post examines three channels through which changes in the energy system could affect UK inflation over different horizons: the composition of energy spending; the relationship between gas and wholesale electricity prices; and supply-chain pressures arising from grid investment.

Why this matters for monetary policy makers

Energy system changes and policy are primarily for governments, not central banks. Still, in setting monetary policy, central banks need to assess how energy shocks affect inflation, output and expectations. Historically, central bankers focused on aggregate oil and gas prices, which have primarily driven energy inflation. In a changing energy supply system, policymakers need to also understand electricity markets, grid constraints and supply chains to assess how they impact aggregate prices through consumer bills and input costs.

A 2024 report by the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and led by the Bank of England entitled ‘The green transition and the macroeconomy: a monetary policy perspective’ offers a useful starting point. It sets out how climate change mitigation, green investment, and transition uncertainty can affect inflation and output over horizons relevant for monetary policy. Recent speeches in 2025 and 2026 have outlined the ways in which climate change and transition shocks are becoming increasingly material over the monetary-policy horizon. This is part of a broader trend of central banks facing more frequent supply-side shocks, as noted in another recent speech. Heightened geopolitical risk is one driver, with the conflict in the Middle East disrupting fossil fuel supply and leading to a higher and more volatile energy inflation as highlighted recently.

At the same time, structural changes in the energy system impact how energy price shocks are transmitted through the economy. The energy transition is a principal element within governments’ net zero commitments; and the UK has made this a central pillar through the Clean Power Act 2030. A recent speech highlighted that a sufficiently high share of renewables in generation together with storage and flexibility can reduce the sensitivity of electricity prices to fossil fuel prices.

Taken together, these factors suggest that the energy transition should be treated as a structural change not simply in the energy environment but also in the macroeconomic environment, and as such as an increasingly important source of changes that monetary policy makers need to understand better.

Responding to this need, and building on the NGFS work on the macroeconomic and monetary policy impacts of the transition, we have developed a framework for assessing the energy transition’s impact on inflation. The framework highlights three ways in which the transition is changing the sources of energy price shocks and their transmission to the macroeconomy and inflation.

The first key aspect is a gradual change in the composition of energy spending.

Chart 1 shows that the weight of electricity in the UK consumer prices index (CPI) has overtaken that of gas and petrol over the past decade. The 2026 weights show that around 2% of the average UK consumer’s total spending goes to electricity, 1.5% to petrol, and 1% to gas. The CPI weights depend on the relative retail prices of the fuels, as well as how much heating and transport depend on each fuel.


Chart 1: CPI weights of electricity, gas and petrol in the United Kingdom

Sources: Office for National Statistics and Bank calculations.


As electrification accelerates in line with the UK Government’s net zero commitments, electricity prices are expected to matter increasingly for inflation, while the importance of oil and gas prices diminish. These changes could also affect inflation through business costs if UK industries electrify their production processes.

To understand the continuously evolving impacts on inflation, policymakers increasingly need to understand how these weights may change and why. For example, changes in relative retail prices of the fuels (a lower electricity-to-gas price ratio) can impact the pace of electrification (through, for example, encouraging the uptake of heat pumps).

The second is a change in the drivers of the wholesale electricity cost.

The disproportionately large role that fossil fuels play in setting wholesale electricity market prices matters, even as the share of clean power increases. This is because the relationship between generation mix and wholesale price-setting is non-linear. Many electricity markets operate a merit order where the on-demand generator with the highest marginal cost sets the market price. And fossil fuel generation tends to have a higher marginal cost than clean power. This means insofar as there are fossil fuel generators on demand, they could set prices, even if their share of generation is smaller than that of clean power.

Further, the quarterly cap on consumer electricity bills set by Ofgem in Great Britain (GB) is based on futures prices, and longer-term fixed tariffs also draw on futures prices. This means that the gas-electricity link we see in the spot market may not flow to consumer bills. Chart 2 shows that in the GB spot (day-ahead) market, the correlation between gas and electricity prices has fallen rapidly since the 2022 energy crisis (aqua line). In contrast, the correlation in the futures market remains close to 1 (purple line). Looking ahead based on gas and electricity futures contracts out to 2030, the latest market pricing suggests the gas-electricity correlation will gradually fall. But this could change as we roll forward; a year ago the futures markets priced the correlation to fall in 2027 (orange line), while the latest observation suggests little change by then (purple line).

The higher-for-longer gas-electricity correlation in the futures market is likely due to the weather risk renewables face: they have less certainty over future generation than gas generators. For example, year-ahead futures prices must account for uncertainty about future wind conditions. By contrast, spot prices reflect how much wind will be available tomorrow, which is much more certain. More renewables and storage – depending on their mix and scale – may reduce the correlation in the coming years.


Chart 2: Electricity and gas price correlations in spot and futures markets in Great Britain

Sources: Bloomberg and Bank calculations.


Further, two-sided Contracts for Difference (CfDs) can reinforce the gas-electricity decoupling. These are long-term fixed-price contracts for clean power generation used in GB and increasingly abroad. CfDs reduce the pass-through from volatile wholesale prices to generator revenues and, indirectly, to the wholesale cost component of consumer bills. They do so by paying back consumers when wholesale market prices rise above their fixed prices and billing consumers an additional amount when market prices are lower.

Chart 3 shows that as CfD generation grew, so did its impact on consumer electricity bills (‘CfD levy’). In normal times, consumers paid an additional levy on top of market prices. During the 2022–23 energy crisis, wholesale market prices were higher than CfD fixed prices, and as a result CfD generators paid consumers the difference, reducing the impact of the gas-price shock on inflation through electricity bills.


Chart 3: Contracts for difference annual generation and average levies in Great Britain

Sources: Low Carbon Contracts Company, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, and Bank calculations.


As a greater share of generation moves onto fixed-price arrangements, gas-price spikes should have a smaller direct effect on electricity bills than in a system where more clean power remains exposed to market prices.

Finally, the third way in which the energy transition is affecting inflation is through changes in the global supply chain for grid buildout.

In many countries, network charges are already a major component of retail electricity prices. As investment in grids scales up, pressures in the global supply chain for the grid, including critical minerals, transformers, and cables could become a more persistent source of inflation. And these pressures could have a broad-based impact on inflation, as the inputs for the grid are also used in other areas such as data centres.

The IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 highlights rising concentration in refining and growing use of export restrictions across energy-related minerals. The same concern extends to grid components, specialised manufacturing capacity and skilled installation. Even without a major geopolitical shock, bottlenecks in these areas can raise costs and delay deployment, putting price pressure on energy bills and a broader set of price items.

Conclusion

The energy transition is not only changing the energy system; it is changing the drivers and transmission of energy inflation. This is not entirely separate from other non-energy determinants of inflation that policymakers are typically concerned about. Monetary policy makers will therefore want to pay closer attention to electricity prices going forward, how the wholesale cost of electricity is shaped, and the supply chains for the grid buildout. Understanding inflation in the transition will increasingly require knowledge of electrification, clean power and critical inputs, to assess the changing composition of energy spending, gas-electricity price link, and impact on the supply chain.


Dooho Shin and Danae Kyriakopoulou work in the Bank’s Climate, Sustainability and Communities Division, and Josh Perers Cook works in the Bank’s Content and Strategy Division.

If you want to get in touch, please email us at bankunderground@bankofengland.co.uk or leave a comment below.

Comments will only appear once approved by a moderator, and are only published where a full name is supplied. Bank Underground is a blog for Bank of England staff to share views that challenge – or support – prevailing policy orthodoxies. The views expressed here are those of the authors, and are not necessarily those of the Bank of England, or its policy committees.

Once Upon A Farm: 3 Key Takeaways for Long-Term Investors


Tractor Wheels is pulled, but the rest of the organic line is still selling above its everyday pace.

By The Motley Fool Team –

Why one lender says buying mortgage software is a dying model


“If I were a software-as-a-service company supporting the mortgage industry, I’d be scared stiff,” Brenning said. “I think that model is going to break because people are going the route we’re going.”

In a June white paper on AI in the mortgage industry, the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) says lenders are increasingly developing their own AI tools, though many companies may still deploy systems from third-party vendors.

The most recent change in eLend’s tech development is a hire from outside mortgage. The company’s new chief technology and innovation officer started earlier this year, and Brenning said his past work includes logistics models for Chewy, a trading platform for Charles Schwab, and machine learning and AI at Cisco.

“Most people in mortgage have gray hair like me,” Brenning said. “We can have some original thoughts, but we can’t be as original or new or fast-moving. For somebody that comes from a completely different industry, that’s innovating at a much more rapid pace than mortgage.”

The new officer has reshaped the technology team around AI engineers, developers and programmers, in place of database administrators. Their output is the small apps and bots eLend has been rolling out almost weekly.

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Alvernia University Will Acquire Marian University In A Deal Both Schools Say Isn’t About Money


Key Points

  • Alvernia University in Reading, Pennsylvania, plans to acquire Marian University in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. The two Catholic schools announced the deal, but it still needs regulatory, accreditor and church approvals.
  • Alvernia says neither school is merging out of financial necessity. Federal data shows Alvernia’s enrollment grew 2.4% over five years while Marian’s fell 24.8%.
  • Nothing changes yet for students. The deal is the latest addition to our running list of 2026 college closures and mergers.

Alvernia University and Marian University announced plans for Alvernia to acquire Marian. Sponsorship of Marian would move from the Congregation of Sisters of St. Agnes to the Bernardine Franciscan Sisters, the order that founded Alvernia.

The deal adds a Wisconsin school to our tracker of 2026 college mergers, and both schools pitch it as a move made from strength.

The schools haven’t released a price, a target date or a plan for Marian’s name and campus. Both will keep operating on their own during institutional, canonical, regulatory and accrediting reviews.

Alvernia calls the announcement “the beginning of a much longer process.” To give a sense of the timeline, Gannon University and Ursuline College (another Catholic pair of colleges on the list of mergers we’re following) signed a letter of intent in September 2024 and expect to finish on December 15, 2026.

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Why It Matters

Alvernia’s FAQ says “Both institutions are approaching this opportunity from a position of strength,” and it lists mission, student opportunity and long-term stewardship as the reasons. That framing stands out because nearly every college that closed in 2026 had lost 30% to 70% of its enrollment over the past decade, according to our 2026 closures tracker.

Alvernia’s half of that claim holds up. Higher Ed Dive reports that Alvernia posted multimillion-dollar budget surpluses in most years of the past decade, with a small deficit in fiscal 2024. Its enrollment grew 2.4% to 2,796 students between fall 2019 and fall 2024, a strong result given the cost pressure private colleges face.

President Glynis Fitzgerald told FOX 11 that Alvernia spent several years working to “strengthen our financial position” first.

Marian’s numbers, though, point the other way. Its enrollment fell 24.8% to 1,246 students over the same five years, and the school has run a deficit every year since fiscal 2023. In 2023, Marian declared an enrollment emergency and cut eight majors and more than a dozen minors. Program cuts are one of the warning signs a college could close we tell families to watch.

Heavy discounting is another. Beginning in fall 2026, Marian offered a 50% tuition award to Catholic high school graduates and registered Catholic parishioners with at least a 2.0 GPA. Big discounts are common, since private colleges now discount tuition by 56% on average.

None of this means Marian was headed for closure, but most of the financial strength in this deal sits on Alvernia’s side.

Alvernia Vs. Marian By The Numbers

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Alvernia Vs. Marian By The Numbers
Measure Alvernia University Marian University
Role In The Deal Acquirer Being acquired
Location Reading, Pa. Fond du Lac, Wis.
Sponsoring Order Bernardine Franciscan Sisters Sisters of St. Agnes, moving to the Bernardine Franciscan Sisters
Fall 2024 Enrollment 2,796 1,246
Five-Year Enrollment Change Up 2.4% Down 24.8%
TCI College Rating D, 41 out of 100 D, 50 out of 100
Average Net Price $27,122 a year $22,225 a year
Recent Budget Results Surpluses most years, small deficit in fiscal 2024 Deficit every year since fiscal 2023
Source: Alvernia University, Higher Ed Dive. The College Investor.

The five-year enrollment trend is the biggest difference between the two schools. Alvernia is more than twice Marian’s size and still growing, while Marian lost about a quarter of its students. Families can compare both schools in our college ratings.

What Does The Merger Mean For Students?

Nothing changes right now for students at either school. Alvernia says the announcement doesn’t change tuition, academic programs, student services, athletics or campus operations. The same FAQ warns that current arrangements “should not be understood as a guarantee against future changes.”

A merger isn’t a closure, so Marian students don’t qualify for a closed school discharge of their federal student loans just because the school changes owners. That relief only applies if a school shuts down before a student can finish. If programs move or get cut later, ask how your credits carry over. Students who switch schools lose an average of 43% of their credits, which is why transfer credit rules matter here.

Students using Marian’s 50% Catholic partnership award or other institutional merit scholarships should ask whether the award renews on the same terms under Alvernia.

High school seniors applying for fall 2027 should ask both schools that question, then run the cost calculator in Alvernia’s college rating or Marian’s college rating.

How This Connects

Alvernia and Marian join a busy year for consolidation. Our 2026 closures and mergers tracker counted four completed mergers and six more in progress as of late October, plus nine nonprofit college closures. Gannon and Ursuline followed the same path, with a Pennsylvania Catholic university taking over a smaller Catholic school in another state. Gannon took control of Ursuline on June 30, and the Diocese of Erie became Ursuline’s new sponsor.

It’s great to see schools being proactive about the future. Planning ahead for the coming enrollment cliff and the declining demographics behind this year’s closures is smart. Continuing to build on academics at the same time is a great pathway forward.

What’s Next

A joint integration committee will recommend how the two schools combine. Marian’s accreditor, the Higher Learning Commission, will also need to approve the change of control.

The deal still needs sign-off from both religious orders, a canonical review and regulators before it closes. Families watching other small private schools can check which colleges could be at risk in 2027 on our tracker.

Editor: Colin Graves

The post Alvernia University Will Acquire Marian University In A Deal Both Schools Say Isn’t About Money appeared first on The College Investor.

Anthropic Had 8 Co-Founders. Only 7 Will Control It After the IPO



The AI giant’s unusual post-IPO governance structure gives seven co-founders collective control. It also leaves an eighth co-founder out.

Why is the economic impact of climate change so uncertain? – Bank Underground


Utkarsh Somaiya and Lewis Holden

Estimates of GDP damages from climate change vary significantly – they are highly uncertain (Chart 1). Why is there so much uncertainty and what is the source of this uncertainty? Our analysis finds the largest source of uncertainty is how climate change is translated into economic damages, rather than uncertainty about the path of future climate change itself.


Chart 1: Uncertainty in global climate change and subsequent economic damages

Notes: Adapted from Mohaddes and Raissi (2025) and IPCC (2021). SSP = Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. See description below.


Uncertainty in climate change science

How will the climate change in the future? The sources of uncertainty here are:

  1. What will future greenhouse gas emissions be?
  2. How will those greenhouse gas emissions affect the climate?

The developments in technology, demographics and consumption which will influence future emissions are unknown and to some extent unknowable. Climate scientists explore this uncertainty by developing illustrative scenarios known as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). SSPs are a range of plausible ways in which technology and socioeconomic factors might develop in the future. Climate scientists use these futures to create possible paths for greenhouse gas emissions and climate forcing. For example, SSP1–2.6, SSP2–4.5 and SSP5–8.5, where a higher final number indicates greater climate forcing and therefore warming. We refer to these as ‘climate scenarios’ and the uncertainty they give rise to as ‘scenario uncertainty’. Chart 1 presents the current vintage of climate scenarios used by the IPCC. Note the framework being developed for future scenarios finds that SSP5–8.5 is now implausible due to the emergence of climate policy, the cost of renewables and recent emission trends.

Climate models estimate the climate impacts of these scenarios, including on global average temperatures. There is uncertainty about different parameters in the climate system, for example the strength of certain feedback effects. Different climate models therefore use different assumptions and parameters. This results in a range of plausible temperature outcomes for a given climate scenario. We refer to this as ‘model uncertainty’.

Even if we had perfect climate models, temperature projections would still be uncertain because of the inherent randomness in the climate system. This creates further uncertainty in temperature outcomes for a given climate scenario.

The relative importance of these sources of uncertainty in climate scenarios depends on the size of the geographic area, the climate variable and the time horizon being considered. In the short term and over smaller geographical areas, randomness in the climate system is the dominant source of uncertainty in temperature projections. Over the long run, climate model uncertainty and scenario uncertainty become more dominant, with randomness becoming almost irrelevant. For global average temperatures, randomness is always less important because random local temperature shocks average out at a global level (Chart 2).


Chart 2: Sources of uncertainty in climate projections

Notes: Adapted from Lehner et al (2020). Global temperatures are 10-year rolling averages.


Uncertainty in economic damages

Economists estimate the impact of the climatic changes on the global economy using ‘damage functions’. Damage functions are simplified, reduced form, relationships which translate variables such as global average temperatures into economic damages. Damage functions don’t model the structural mechanisms through which climate affects the economy, or how economic activity can feedback into affecting the climate. This simplification means that they do not model how economies might adapt to climate change over time.

There is also uncertainty about which variables should be used in these reduced form relationships. For example, whether changes in temperature at the global or local level determine damages. Within these approaches, the specific mechanism through which climate affects economic output is also uncertain. For example, whether climate change:

• continuously supresses the level of economic output
• reduces the economy’s long-term growth rate
• also manifests as periodic catastrophic shocks to the level and/or growth rate of the economy
• affects the economy through some combination of all of the above

The consequence of this uncertainty is that there is no consensus on the basic relationship between climate change and economic damages.

The importance of different sources of uncertainty

What is the relative importance of economic uncertainty versus climate change uncertainty? Howard and Sterner (2025) derive three damage function specifications for level, growth and catastrophic effects based on a meta-analysis of the literature. This can be seen as capturing the ‘average’ effect of the level, growth, and catastrophic assumptions in the literature.

We developed a framework to quantify the relative importance of these sources of uncertainty. First, we took the full range of plausible temperature pathways from all climate scenarios. We put these temperature pathways into the ‘level effects’ specification of the damage function from Howard and Sterner. This gives us a range of economic damage estimates where the variation is driven by climate scenario uncertainty. At this stage, we have not introduced uncertainty because of the damage function. The full uncertainty range of plausible damages, denoted by the green area in Chart 3, is between 0% and -7% of GDP.

We can then decompose this uncertainty by exploring the range of damages within a single climate scenario, but considering the range of plausible temperature pathways estimated by climate models within that scenario. This captures climate model uncertainty and is denoted by the blue area in Chart 3. Finally, as we are looking at global damages, we find climate randomness has little effect (Chart 3; orange area).


Chart 3: Economic damage estimates – uncertainty decomposition


Next, we put the same temperature pathways from all climate scenarios into every possible damage function from Howard and Sterner’s meta-analysis. This allows us to quantify the additional uncertainty that is created because we don’t know the ‘correct’ damage function. This additional uncertainty increases the range of economic damages to between 1% and -37%, denoted by the purple area in Chart 3. The damage function uncertainty range expands further into the future. This reflects how damage functions are built: they tend to assume that each extra degree of warming causes more damage than the previous one.

These results suggest the largest source of uncertainty is because we don’t know how temperature changes translate into economic damages, rather than uncertainty about the path of future temperatures themselves.

Can we reduce uncertainty?

Uncertainties can be thought of as gaps in human knowledge that can be improved over time. Uncertainty is the engine of science; it drives us to build theories, develop models, and test our hypotheses against data. Some of the uncertainties we’ve identified can be reduced over time (Table A).


Table A: Reducibility of different sources of uncertainty


Reducing economic uncertainty has been characterised as particularly difficult because economists study complex social systems. These systems are characterised by constantly shifting human behaviour and expectations, where cause and effect are hard to disentangle. Despite these challenges, institutions like central banks are working together to improve our understanding of the impact of climate change on monetary and financial stability, as demonstrated by a recent report by the Network for Greening the Financial System.

Conclusion

We decomposed the sources of climate and economic uncertainty that explain the range of economic damage estimates in Chart 1. In the short term, climate uncertainty is largely random. Globally and over longer horizons, climate model and scenario uncertainty dominate. But the largest source of uncertainty in future economic damages is because we don’t know how climate change affects the global economy. This outweighs uncertainty about future climate change itself.

We have made incredible progress in understanding both the climate system and its interaction with the economy. Some of the remaining uncertainty will be reduced further over time. But reducing uncertainty will take time. Waiting for too much certainty risks delaying decision-making until it is too late.

So how can central banks and other institutions act in the face of uncertainty?

If tail outcomes are catastrophic for the economy and our models are uncertain, one response is simply precaution. Decision-making under uncertainty emphasises building resilience to plausible catastrophic outcomes. Similarly, central banks and other financial institutions may want to place more emphasis on avoiding specific, worst-case scenarios. We know enough about climate change to know that some plausible outcomes are catastrophic. So even in the face of uncertainties, precautionary actions can be taken to build resilience to these outcomes.


Utkarsh Somaiya previously worked in the Bank’s Financial Risk Management Division and currently works at Dalberg Advisors, and Lewis Holden works in the Bank’s Financial Risk Management Division.

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Comments will only appear once approved by a moderator, and are only published where a full name is supplied. Bank Underground is a blog for Bank of England staff to share views that challenge – or support – prevailing policy orthodoxies. The views expressed here are those of the authors, and are not necessarily those of the Bank of England, or its policy committees.