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AI Is Giving Us Time Back. What Are We Doing With It?


Opinions expressed by Entrepreneur contributors are their own.

Key Takeaways

  • Leaders have spent years trying to remove unnecessary friction from work, and AI has been the most recent solution permeating almost every industry.
  • While AI can free up your time by automating mundane tasks, what matters more is what you’re doing with that newfound free time.

An employee has a question. A few years ago, they might have messaged a colleague, walked over to someone’s desk or waited until the next team meeting. Today, they can ask AI and have an answer in seconds.

That is progress. Good technology should remove friction, reduce waiting and help people move forward. I understand the instinct. If I can get the same answer in 30 seconds without interrupting someone else, of course I am going to do that.

But I wonder if the old conversation was producing more than an answer. It may have shown the employee how someone more experienced approached the problem or surfaced context that was never written down. Sometimes a small interaction becomes a relationship that matters much later. From the perspective of the task, the interaction may have looked inefficient. From the perspective of the organization, it may have been building something.

A shift in who we ask

That question has stayed with me as I have reviewed forthcoming BambooHR research on how AI is changing the workday. Employees estimate that they now spend nearly an hour and a half each day interacting with AI. Among the part of the day they spend in conversation rather than working alone, about 2 in 5 interactions are with AI rather than another person.

There are good reasons for that. AI is fast. It is always available. It does not look busy or make you feel as though you should already know the answer. You can ask the same question three different ways without testing anyone’s patience.

Many employees say they would rather quietly ask AI than admit they need help. I get why. Asking another person carries a little social risk, and AI takes most of that away. That can make people more independent, and there is real value in that. But I wonder if we are also removing one of the simplest ways workplace relationships begin.

When I ask someone for help, I am doing more than getting information. I am showing that I value their judgment. They get a little window into how I am thinking. Sometimes the relationship that follows matters more than the answer itself.

What else did the interaction produce?

Technology leaders have spent years trying to remove unnecessary friction from work. That is usually the right goal. Poor systems, repetitive processes, pointless approvals and meetings without a purpose drain people’s time and energy. AI gives us a new opportunity to remove much more of that.

Before we automate an interaction away, though, I think we have to understand what it was actually doing inside the organization.

The new research points to a meaningful difference between time spent with AI and time spent with coworkers. AI time is concentrated on completing tasks, experimenting, refining prompts and correcting output. Coworker time includes execution too, but much more of it goes toward sharing knowledge, brainstorming, mentoring and building relationships.

Those things are harder to measure because they do not always produce an immediate deliverable. Their value often shows up later, when a junior employee knows whom to call during a difficult moment or when someone has watched an experienced colleague make a judgment call where the answer was not obvious.

The mentorship gap

This matters especially for people early in their careers. Most employees say they have learned something valuable from a colleague at a different career stage. Many also believe cross-generational mentorship is becoming harder as younger employees rely more heavily on AI.

There is something important in that tension. We value what we learn from one another while adopting tools that let us skip some of the awkwardness, delay and vulnerability that often start the learning process.

AI can give you a good answer. It may even explain the answer better than a rushed colleague. But professional judgment is rarely just the answer. It is knowing when the technically correct answer will not work in this company, understanding which trade-off matters most or recognizing a pattern because you have seen some version of the problem before.

A lot of that is learned by watching other people think. If employees become more self-sufficient task by task, leaders still have to ask whether the organization is becoming more capable over time.

The efficiency dividend

We have spent a great deal of time deciding what AI should do. We have spent less time deciding what people should be freer to do because of it.

The default answer in many organizations is more work. A task that once took an hour now takes 20 minutes, so the remaining time fills up with another task, another message or another expectation. The efficiency disappears into a fuller calendar.

My instinct is that the answer cannot simply be more output. If AI gives a manager back an hour, maybe some of that hour should go toward coaching. If it gives an experienced employee more capacity, maybe there is more room to explain how they reached a decision rather than simply sending the answer.

That is work too. And I suspect it becomes more valuable as transactional work gets easier.

More human work

Some friction should disappear. Poor systems and unnecessary interruptions aren’t worth preserving simply because they create human interaction.

The opportunity is to be more deliberate about what fills the capacity AI creates. Judgment, coaching, creativity and connection become more important as transactional work gets easier. So the question is where speed matters most and where another person actually changes the quality of the outcome.

The employee from the beginning of this article may still be right to ask AI. The answer arrives quickly, the task moves forward and no one is interrupted.

AI is going to make it easier for us to need one another less for a lot of everyday work. The more interesting question is what we do with that freedom. Ideally, we use some of it for the things that become better when another person is actually there.

Key Takeaways

  • Leaders have spent years trying to remove unnecessary friction from work, and AI has been the most recent solution permeating almost every industry.
  • While AI can free up your time by automating mundane tasks, what matters more is what you’re doing with that newfound free time.

An employee has a question. A few years ago, they might have messaged a colleague, walked over to someone’s desk or waited until the next team meeting. Today, they can ask AI and have an answer in seconds.

That is progress. Good technology should remove friction, reduce waiting and help people move forward. I understand the instinct. If I can get the same answer in 30 seconds without interrupting someone else, of course I am going to do that.

But I wonder if the old conversation was producing more than an answer. It may have shown the employee how someone more experienced approached the problem or surfaced context that was never written down. Sometimes a small interaction becomes a relationship that matters much later. From the perspective of the task, the interaction may have looked inefficient. From the perspective of the organization, it may have been building something.

A shift in who we ask

That question has stayed with me as I have reviewed forthcoming BambooHR research on how AI is changing the workday. Employees estimate that they now spend nearly an hour and a half each day interacting with AI. Among the part of the day they spend in conversation rather than working alone, about 2 in 5 interactions are with AI rather than another person.

There are good reasons for that. AI is fast. It is always available. It does not look busy or make you feel as though you should already know the answer. You can ask the same question three different ways without testing anyone’s patience.

Is Palantir Overvalued, or Is It Still a Buy at This Price?


Palantir trades at a high P/E ratio, but investors need to factor the company’s expected growth into the equation before jumping to conclusions.

By Will Healy –

United Restricts MileagePlus eGift Card Purchases Starting November 18


United Restricts MileagePlus eGift Card Purchases

United Airlines is making a change to MileagePlus X, limiting the ability to purchase gift cards. Starting November 18, 2026, purchases will be restricted to select MileagePlus members.

Under the new rules, only the following members will be able to purchase MileagePlus eGift cards:

  • United MileagePlus Premier members
  • MileagePlus members with an eligible United credit card

Regular MileagePlus members who don’t meet either requirement will no longer be able to purchase new eGift cards.

HT: reddit

Private Markets in Retirement Plans: Fiduciary Risks


For smaller fiduciaries, the opportunity extends beyond faster administration.

A qualified professional could examine existing analysis, understand its origin and limitations, and concentrate on whether it applies to a particular plan. A specialist could address a defined gap with sufficient context. A later reviewer could identify which assumptions changed without reconstructing the entire investment case.

These are potential capacity gains, not established savings. They depend on preserving enough context to make prior work useful while requiring each fiduciary to assess its relevance. Reusing analysis must not become copying conclusions across different plans.

Testing that distinction calls for cooperation. Authorities can help identify oversight questions; allocators can identify decisions that existing information does not adequately support; providers can contribute implementation knowledge; and independent fiduciaries can assess whether the approach works with limited resources.

One fee decision offers a practical starting point. Compare reviewers’ ability to identify the relevant costs, challenge the comparator, locate qualifications, and recognize when reconsideration is necessary. Include preparation costs, maintenance demands, errors, and omissions.

Your Team Is ‘Putting Out Fires’ All Wrong. This Is How Real Firefighters Do It



Firefighters do not improvise command from scratch. Their systems reveal how businesses can turn uncertainty, distributed teams, and pressure into action.

AD Mortgage’s 2026 Survey: What Mortgage Professionals Expected and What Followed


Loan Volume: Growth Came With a Slowdown

Fannie Mae’s October estimates put originations at approximately $1.64 trillion through the first three quarters, up 16.3% year over year. Quarterly growth slowed from about 50.7% in the first quarter to 0.4% in the third.

That supports respondents’ expectations of growth at a market level. More favorable early-year rates helped create opportunities, although the improvement was not necessarily shared by every professional.

Refinancing: Rates Changed the Opportunity

Last year, 37.1% of respondents expected refinance borrowers to lead their business.

Fannie Mae estimated refinancing represented 50% of first-quarter originations, falling to 25% in the third quarter. Lower early-year rates gave some borrowers a reason to refinance. As rates climbed, fewer could find sufficient savings to make the transaction worthwhile, helping explain why that early momentum faded.

Rates: A Recurring Barrier

In 2025, 59.7% identified rates as the main reason borrowers hesitated. Fannie Mae’s October figures show quarterly average 30-year rates rising from 6.1% in the first quarter to 6.7% in the third. That progression helps connect the year’s stronger start with its later slowdown. For brokers, finding a payment that works for borrowers remained a recurring challenge, even when demand was there.

Defense tech CEOs say Pentagon’s ‘Industrial Age’ bureaucracy must adapt to modern warfare



As AI-enabled drones transform the way wars are fought in Ukraine and Iran, two leaders of military tech startups warned on Tuesday that the Pentagon has to move faster to keep up with modern warfare. 

“There’s a growing realization that if you don’t act now, it will be existential in the near future,” Tyler Sweatt, CEO of defense software deployment company Second Front Systems, told Fortune’s Allie Garfinkle at the Fortune 500 Innovation Forum.

While venture money is pouring into defense tech at record levels, the Pentagon hasn’t sped up to match, and investors want returns. Sweatt said that pressure means defense tech companies will likely consolidate in “a tranche of deals” in the next six months. Shield AI, the autonomous weapon developer whose CEO Gary Steele joined Sweatt onstage, has already started: It announced Nov. 5 that it’s raising $2.5 billion to support its acquisition of radar systems company Echodyne in a transaction valued at $5.3 billion.

Sweatt and Steele said the Pentagon’s lengthy approval processes and outdated systems could keep new tech from reaching troops quickly enough. Sweatt described the Pentagon as an “Industrial Age organization” bogged down with “big long bureaucracies” and “antiquated technology production lines” that will have to change. 

“We’re at the beginning of this journey, not the end of this journey,” Steele added. “It will take time because things move slowly; the technology is not moving slowly.”

Sweatt and Steele’s concerns echo those of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published in July, which found the average time needed to deliver a capability across the Pentagon’s major weapon acquisition programs rose to over 12 years, and the watchdog predicted this average “will likely increase in the future.” 

Steele contrasted those delays with Shield’s autonomous fighter jet, which the company designed to fly alongside aircraft piloted by humans using its Hivemind software. He said his company expects the time “from conception to first flight” will be less than two years. By comparison, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 started development in 2001 and flew in 2011, and in total took 23 years from being awarded the Pentagon contract to being cleared for full-rate production. 

But Steele said Shield can develop its aircraft faster because it being autonomous means it’s not endangering pilots in the testing process. In separate tests last month, Shield’s Hivemind software executed directions from a F-22 pilot and enabled the coordination of multiple uncrewed aircrafts called CCAs. 

“We can go faster because we’re not putting people’s lives at risk every single day,” Steele said. “We can think about that iterative development cycle to get very different outcomes at speeds that never could have happened before.”

VC appetite for defense tech

Venture capitalists are now keen on investing, though that hasn’t always been the case. They deployed a record $37.9 billion into defense tech across 269 deals in Q3 2026, up 117.5% quarter over quarter, according to Pitchbook data.

“Defense tech was in the same category as porn and gambling, and that’s all changed,” Steele said. 

But Sweatt, whose company is valued at $1.2 billion per Pitchbook data, added that the influx of funding and increased defense spending by U.S. allies doesn’t mean new tech will reach the military immediately.

“It takes a minute for that tail to really reach the tooth,” he said, referring to the lag between investment in defense tech and its actual implementation in the battlefield. 

That delay could also test whether defense tech companies can justify their valuations, with Shield doubling its valuation to $28.8 billion from $12.7 billion in March. Anduril CEO Brian Schimpf, whose company is valued at $61 billion, even said at the Fortune Brainstorm Tech conference in June that defense tech could be in “a bit of a bubble.”

“I think the next 24 months are probably going to confirm or deny the bubble hypothesis,” Sweatt said. 

Shop Via Text & Get $5 Off


The Offer

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  • Amazon is offering $5 off when you shop via text for the first time 

Our Verdict

$5 off is $5 off. I don’t think I’d ever use this feature without a discount but will happy take any discounts offered. 

Nvidia’s tutorial on genuine good governance, needed by tech bros and governistas alike



Charles de Gaulle said, “The graveyards are filled with indispensable men.” That rings especially true despite the pathetic cries of the ‘Bring Jensen Back’ bros.

Nvidia’s strong earnings release today proves once and for all that Nvidia does not need Jensen Huang to return to flourish as a strong American national champion. Interim CEO Colette Kress deftly raised forecasts moving forward, pointing to the underlying strength of the business, which is far greater than any one individual, while winning plaudits for running the earnings call with command, presence, and impressive candor. And indeed, new board chair Harvey Jones definitely closed the door on Jensen Huang’s return as CEO amidst news that the SEC is now probing Huang and Nvidia.

All this makes the unresolved governance questions and lessons from the Nvidia debacle even more important.

In the aftermath of Jensen Huang’s ouster from Nvidia this week, a tiny band of tech bros, perhaps intoxicated by their own sudden wealth and prominence, have cast good governance principles to the wind by unrealistically advocating for the return of Jensen Huang, decrying the “woke” politically correct management policies which they believe led to Huang’s exit. At the same time, a chorus of finger-pointing good governance advocates has joined the fray, throwing every pet theory of organizational structure and regulatory restraints on risk-seeking entrepreneurs. Both camps ignore the real collapse of board oversight, which is the tragically poor judgement of the CEO matched with the faulty character and faulty process of board oversight and not its clunky bureaucratic mechanics.

The tech bro cheerleaders rooted for a messianic return of Huang, despite the ongoing investigations into his wide array of apparently corrupt actions and character collapses, such as his blatant violations of Nvidia’s code of conduct and unresolved national security concerns. The arrogant, naïve fantasies in the chants of these tech bros is encapsulated by Telegram founder Pavel Durov’s X post declaring, “Jensen made a rookie mistake. He had a board”, apparently forgetting that any executive who is entrusted with other people’s money owes a fiduciary duty to their shareholders first, above their own self-enrichment. They are happy to snag the money but then to dodge accountability.

Then, on the other end of the critics’ spectrum, good governance advocates, self-declared governistas, have rushed to offer a smattering of bad solutions for Nvidia’s governance woes. These proposed solutions are as ludicrous as they are trite, and as irrelevant as they are ineffectual.

For example, Charlie Elson at the University of Delaware somehow baselessly managed to blame a favorite bogeyman of many governistas, dual-class shares, for Nvidia’s woes — even though Nvidia has a single-class stock structure and not dual-class shares at all, a rather inconvenient fact which nevertheless did not detract from Elson launching into his tiring tirades. Elson bewilderingly argued in Directors & Boards that “in the end, this may spark, and I hope it does, a real reconsideration of the whole notion of dual-class stock in publicly traded companies”, as if that would be a panacea for all of Nvidia’s board woes, an argument which The New York Times also haplessly repeated.

Similarly, governance professor Richard LeBlanc of York University proposed an independent chair as the panacea to all Nvidia’s governance woes, even though Nvidia already had an independent lead director who was the former CEO of Cooley Law Firm, Stephen Neal.

All of these proposed governista solutions are irrelevant cliches offering insufficient and misguided recipes.

Between clumsy New York Times op-eds, delusional Silicon Valley social media campaigns, and even an ideologically charged, anti-management Delaware Chancery Court judge, it appears that both anti-oversight tech bros and scolding governistas need to relearn some basic lessons about corporate board diligence.

Here’s what these self-anointed governance experts miss and what the real lessons for boards from the Nvidia crisis are:

  • Don’t build your business on other people’s money and then later resent accountability to them
  • Don’t fall for mindless metrics which miss the actual process of governance — much like the way the “Goodhart’s Law” of economics warns over confusing the metric with the underlying phenomena
  • Don’t confuse capital structure, whether dual-class shares or single class shares, as indicators of board caliber, board culture, and genuine independence
  • Don’t fall victim to vague admonitions over “good faith” as genuine definitions of proper board diligence.
  • Don’t rely on your accountants and attorneys to protect you – as the buck stops with you.

The checklist fallacy that ISS, Glass Lewis, and many good governance advocates have fallen into

All of the misguided proposed solutions from governistas tend to draw from the same wrongheaded playbook that ISS and Glass Lewis have preached for decades, recited on cue by the governistas: split the chair and CEO roles, encourage more so-called independent board members, tally the committees, and count board diversity. As we have argued in Fortune, this tired and trite playbook has never been able to tell a good board from a bad one.

Consider how Nvidia was an ISS and Glass Lewis box-checker’s showpiece. Every director but Huang was technically independent. It had an independent lead director who was a former CEO of a respected law firm; independent audit, compensation and governance committees and committee chairs; annual elections for every board position without any staggered terms; and the ‘one vote per share’ principle so beloved by governistas. Huang was not even chairman of his own board: Nvidia had no chairman at all until he left, so Nvidia even fit the technical separation of roles box with a separate lead independent director. In June, shareholders re-elected all ten directors, the CEO with 99% of the vote, with ISS supporting the entire director slate this year, as it has each year for many years now.

But the Nvidia crisis reminds us all just how misleading are the metrics of ISS and Glass Lewis’ checklist. This ‘check-the-box’ approach does absolutely nothing to actually weed out genuinely responsible boards from boards asleep at the switch operating on a bedraggled autopilot. Indeed, it is ironic that many of the worst corporate governance crises this century have been at companies which were darlings of the governista community.

For example, Enron had 12 independent directors among its 14 directors, split the chairman and CEO roles in its final year, and had a former dean of Stanford’s business school, an accounting professor, chairing its audit committee, winning widespread praise from governance advocates with one governance publication even naming the Enron board one of America’s five best boards in 2000 – right before Enron blew up, exposed as a fraud. Similarly, Silicon Valley Bank had an independent chair and a board that was entirely independent other than its CEO, and 10 of Lehman Brothers’ 11 directors were independent.

Indeed, when Stanford researchers tested ISS’s then-flagship governance rating against five measures of how companies actually fared, including restatements, shareholder lawsuits and stock performance, they found no significant correlation with any of them.

The first author wrote in Harvard Business Review in 2002, “In the wake of the meltdowns of such once great companies as Adelphia, Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, enormous attention has been focused on the companies’ boards … And yet a close examination of those boards reveals no broad pattern of incompetence or corruption. In fact, the boards followed most of the accepted standards for board operations: Members showed up for meetings; they had lots of personal money invested in the company; audit committees, compensation committees, and codes of ethics were in place; the boards weren’t too small, too big, too old, or too young.”

Alas, the reliance upon such banal bromides of supposed good governance, lead to the recitation of platitudes in publications but worse yet miss the targeted need entirely – much the way the Goodhart’s Law of economics warns us to not confuse the metrics of the tool with the assessment of the underlying phenomena itself. This is also parallel to intelligence testing, where the test is an indicator of performance against the unidimensional artificial metrics of the intelligence test as an instrument itself and misses the many other untested dimensions of intelligence as Harvard psychologist Howard Gardner has pointed out in his classic Frames of Mind analysis.

The dual-class red herring

Another favorite bogeyman of the governance community tends to be dual-class shares, and this long-held bias is once again rearing its ugly head with governance commentators rushing to blame dual-class shares for the Nvidia crisis – even though, ironically and inconveniently, Nvidia only has one class of stock, and Nvidia has never actually had dual-class shares at all.

Indeed, ISS now generally universally recommends against directors at companies with unequal voting rights, without exception, reflecting how widely held this erroneous strain of thinking is entrenched in some circles of the governance community.

By way of full disclosure, we are sometimes wrongly identified as an ‘advocate for dual-class structures’, in the words of Vice Chancellor Travis Laster of the Delaware Chancery Court, who has been overturned by the Delaware Supreme Court no less than 35 times in his idiosyncratic and tortured readings of the law.

But we are not the universal dual-class share advocate Laster misleadingly portrays us as. Our view is much more nuanced and captured in the conclusion of my Harvard Law Corporate Governance Forum piece: “In evaluating the outperformance of dual-class shares and in evaluating common scenarios where dual-class shares work especially well, balanced against common pitfalls, the evidence is clear that for companies, there is no single right answer between dual-class, multi-class, or single-class shares. It is all situational, dependent on a company’s circumstances, the demonstrated caliber of their leadership, and the environment in which they operate. Just as dual-class shares are not the right structure for all companies; dual-class shares can make sense for certain companies, in certain scenarios. These crucial nuances are often lost in what has increasingly become the single-minded zealotry of ‘one share, one vote’ advocates, seeking to impose single class structures on all companies irrespective of circumstance.”

Indeed, what critics of dual-class shares like Laster and Elson miss is that some of the worst corporate collapses and frauds of the modern era had ‘one share, one vote’ share structures, ranging from Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, Arthur Andersen, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Wirecard, FTX, Silicon Valley Bank, and First Republic Bank, all of which share a single commonality: they did not have dual-class shares. Thus, critics like Charlie Elson who blame dual-class shares for Nvidia’s woes are committing the sin of governance by non sequitur. It is like prosecuting a car company for making potential getaway cars for a robbery which was actually committed on foot. Clearly, a formula that indiscriminately, automatically scores Berkshire Hathaway’s share structure as a vice and Nvidia’s as a virtue, without human discernment or space for an iota of discretion, is measuring based on the wrong yardstick.

What actually failed at Nvidia, and what it reveals about governista blind spots

What failed at Nvidia was not any of the factors identified above; rather, it was the caliber of the directors and the culture amongst the board that proved problematic.

As the first author wrote in the seminal Harvard Business Review article in 2002, ‘What Makes Great Boards Great’, great boards are social systems before they are governance structures. They build enough trust that management brings bad news early, with open and candid discussions and no secrets kept. Great boards treat dissent as a duty, and promote cultures where questioning authority is not only welcome but expected. They rotate roles so that no director is typecast as a permanent cheerleader or scold.

As my former colleague, the former Yale School of Management Dean and former SEC Chairman Bill Donaldson said at a Yale CEO Summit many years ago, “On the subject of board governance… corporate governance has become a cottage industry with lots of opportunists, and there’s some very superficial thought out there about what a board really is…..The least examined is that it is a social entity. It has human beings on it. Nobody talks much about that. Everybody says, ‘Oh, you ought to have certain people on the audit committee because they’ll be independent, etc., etc.’

“There hasn’t been nearly enough work done on the social contract on the board and the recognition of what is really going on, on that board. And a lot of times, what’s really going on bears the seeds of horror stories. Perhaps there’s a group that’s aligned improperly, and that group dominates either through tenure on the board or whatever and allows bad things to go on because nobody really recognizes what those interpersonal relationships are.”

Donaldson emphasized that great boards hold each director accountable and grade their own performance as hard as the CEO’s, and this gets to the caliber of the board as well as the culture of the board. None of this works without directors of the stature to look a monarch in the eye. As I wrote in The Hero’s Farewell, monarchs are larger than life CEOs who would leave office only by death or palace revolt. With a visionary founder, a board’s job is to retain and contain: keep the genius, check the hubris.

But Nvidia’s board lacked the stature to contain or check Huang’s impulses; they could only retain and worship. Evaluating the board members individually, no Nvidia director has ever run an S&P 500 company and none has national security experience, at a company whose chips are a national security asset. Industry peers Microsoft, IBM, and Dell each have at least four current and former big-company CEOs on their board; Nvidia had none. And apparently, the board was asleep at the switch on succession planning, which is one of the primary functions of a board. Nobody thought to groom even an emergency successor for a CEO with more than 60 direct reports and no president or chief operating officer beneath him, and a system of doing business through handshake deals to centralize all power in himself. And when the crisis came, the board’s first instinct was to vouch for him before its own investigation had begun before finally surrendering to the facts of the situation.

Similarly, it was plainly inadequate and insufficient for Nvidia’s board, to simply defer to the professional judgment of their advisors, such as their external accountant PwC or their external law firm Cooley. PwC signed off on financial reports with what many experts consider to be questionable accounting, obfuscating the geographic origins of Nvidia’s revenues and the end users of sensitive Nvidia chips in ways that could possibly open the board up to legal claims of failure of oversight if not even perhaps fraud in the eyes of many experts.

Even today, there still seems to be a latent expectation amongst some in tech circles, including apparently from Huang himself, that a weak Nvidia board will just collapse and bring Huang back in deference to the founder if enough pressure is brought to bear. Huang himself put out an unusual statement this morning, saying that “If the Board of Directors decides that my return is in the best interest of our shareholders, our employees, the company, and America, I would be honored to answer these calls and return as CEO”, even though Huang is now the target of no less than 4 ongoing government investigations across congressional oversight hearings and federal probes as well as multiple shareholder lawsuits. Certainly, Marshal Philippe Petain of Vichy France; the deposed Emperor Napoleon, Enron’s disgraced Jeff Skilling, Worldcom’s deposed Bernie Ebbers, and other deposed monarchs dragged out kicking and screaming would have likewise enthusiastically volunteered to return after being thrown out by their constituents. Bewilderingly, even some proxy ratings firms like Egan Jones seem to be lending implicit support to the ‘Bring Jensen Back’ movement, declaring that “It is not entirely clear the board acted in the best interest of shareholders” by removing Huang, looking past the evasion of sanctions, national security, and accounting integrity concerns to say the board should not have removed Jensen on the basis of shareholder returns from prior, possibly misleading financial reports.

Lessons for boards moving forward – especially in working with a strong founder

What Nvidia’s board woes highlight is that contrary to the outdated ideas of some – for example, how Travis Laster would define ‘good faith’ as checking hot tempers at the door – the measure of genuine board diligence is the willingness to foster board cultures of open dissent and genuine partnership with CEOs over blind deference.

The latter challenge is especially salient when it comes to working with larger-than-life founders. The right answer is not for boards to go to war with these creative geniuses by trying to suppress them, or to lose trust by trying to fire them over foot faults. Rather, it is up to the board to develop governance practices that show they know how to partner with the genius they are privileged to have among them.

The boards of Microsoft, Amazon, Dell, Starbucks and, ultimately, Apple figured out how to work with Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, Michael Dell, Howard Schultz and Steve Jobs, forging alignment between the needs of their founder visionary CEOs and the shareholders. These boards helped their founders appreciate and address their human frailties, whether with non-accusatory accountability (as with Gates through Microsoft anti-trust litigation) or during health crises (Jobs’ battle with cancer and need for credible succession plan).

It is not easy to regulate genius and creative founders do not resemble rational people as they challenge the daunting odds of success that most people wisely avoid. They are also often obsessed and single minded about their visions – which seem to many to be delusions seeking a mirage of unattainable entrepreneurial success. Yet their innovations can disrupt and transform society on the few occasions where they succeed.

Sigmund Freud reminded us that society is changed by its discontents. Painter Robert Motherwell confessed that as an artist there is never satisfaction, because creative joy is mixed with the anguish of what could be. But at the same time, boards must recognize that they are not dealing with an artist painting in a private studio on their own canvas, but rather an artist who is using other people’s resources, painting on a public canvas, and so must listen to other voices.

Only by forging genuine partnerships with their CEO built on trust and mutual candor, can boards strike the right balance between blind deference and overbearing suffocation, particularly when it comes to working with bigger-than-life visionary founders. The lesson for boards, and what both sides of the critics’ spectrum misses, is that the solution is not related to the structure of the board; rather, it is the professional courage to do their jobs fully, and nobody can legislate performance through checklists or rulebooks.

The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.