When Jensen Huang resigned as Nvidia’s CEO on Thursday, critics of the U.S.’s policy of restricting chip sales to China lost one of their biggest allies.
In addition to being one of the industry’s biggest proponents of the AI buildout, Huang remains one of the most vocal critics of U.S. policies that bar the sale of advanced chips and chipmaking equipment to China. He claimed that these measures would encourage the creation of a competing Chinese chip industry, and that it was better for the U.S. to keep Chinese companies hooked on U.S. technology.
Nvidia’s CEO was also a strong supporter of open-source AI models—many of which came from Chinese developers like DeepSeek—in the face of criticism that such models posed a serious cybersecurity threat.
Revelations that Huang had an affair with Alice Huang (no relation)—a former executive at Megaspeed, a Singaporean company suspected of funnelling controlled chips to China—has torched the Nvidia CEO’s credibility on the issue of export controls. (Some reports claim U.S. intelligence considered Alice Huang to be part of a Chinese espionage campaign against Nvidia, but others have cast doubt on that assessment).
On Monday morning, the U.S. Department of Commerce released the first update to its export control regime since the scandal broke, issuing an interim final rule that closes a longstanding loophole that allowed Chinese companies to access AI chips based in overseas data centers, and expands export controls to an array of Southeast Asian countries. Congress, too, is debating several laws that would codify and expand existing export controls.
Yet tighter rules may also complicate matters for other countries trying to forge a more neutral path between the U.S. and China
How likely are tighter export controls?
Current export controls block the most advanced AI processors—made by companies like Nvidia, AMD, and Intel—from being sold to Chinese companies, though the Trump administration has allowed sales of Nvidia’s H200 to approved Chinese customers. Chipmaking equipment and high-bandwidth memory are also blocked.
Commerce’s new rule—which will go into effect immediately once it’s included in the Federal Register—would require licenses to export advanced AI chips to data centers in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil. It would also require a license if large data center operators anywhere in the world want to grant access to companies headquartered in China, effectively closing the remote access loophole. Data centers already serving such companies will have 90 days from the rule’s effective date to get a license.
The Trump administration may remain split on how to act against chip smuggling; interestingly, the press release from the Commerce Department notes the rules were “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council.” But Congress may act if the Trump administration remains divided.
“The regulatory path in Washington is going to be harder and bumpier,” Hanna Dohmen, a senior research analyst at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, told Fortune before the rule’s release. She pointed out that several bills have been included in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act. The Huang scandal “adds momentum to push those bills through, and the chance of those passing are likelier than ever.”
“No matter what Trump does, it’s possible that Congress should be able to provide limitations,” Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said before the rule’s release. “It’s not only about Trump anymore.”
Congress, meanwhile, is closer than ever to locking those controls into law.
The first bill, the Remote Access Security Act, also seeks to close the remote access loophole, giving the Commerce Department authority to license and penalize foreign companies tapping advanced U.S. AI chips from abroad. (The House passed the bill in January and is still awaiting consideration in the Senate).
The second bill, the Chip Security Act, would require advanced chips to ship with security measures, like location tracking, to ensure processors aren’t diverted upon export. It also requires exporters to promptly disclose evidence of diversion or smuggling. Yet the act does not go as far as to mandate kill switches or more aggressive measures to stop smuggling.
The third, the AI Overwatch Act, would treat advanced chips like weapons: before any sale to China or other adversaries, the administration would have to notify Congress, which could then block the deal with a joint resolution of disapproval. It also carries an “America First AI” provision requiring Commerce to certify that exports won’t leave U.S. customers short of computing power.
The fourth, the MATCH Act, may be the most aggressive. The act would largely ban the sale and servicing of deep ultraviolet lithography tools across China, and imposes broader restrictions on facilities associated with major Chinese chipmakers like SMIC and CXMT. It gives allies like Japan and the Netherlands 150 days to align their own controls with Washington’s; if they fail, the U.S. can extend controls to equipment supplied from those countries, even if they contain no U.S.-made components.
Still, Dohmen pointed out that changing the rules alone won’t be enough to entirely halt chip smuggling. Several measures still require follow-on enforcement by either the U.S. or third parties; she pointed out that knowing that a chip was smuggled matters little if the Bureau of Industry and Security doesn’t act.
How might third parties respond?
Much of the attention during the Nvidia scandal has fallen on Southeast Asia, and Singapore and Malaysia in particular. Megaspeed, the company accused of funnelling Nvidia chips to China, is based in Singapore; Malaysia was also reportedly the home of Megaspeed’s data centers. Megaspeed has denied sending chips to China.
“The administration wants to encourage Malaysia and Singapore to remain in the American AI ecosystem, but it doesn’t want them to become conduits through which Chinese firms can obtain advanced chips—or remotely access the computing power those chips provide,” Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, said. “That has been its policy so far and I don’t anticipate this changing.”
The new Commerce Department rule does offer a carve-out for end-users that are, or are owned by, a U.S.-headquartered company. The region has attracted billions of dollars of investment from U.S. tech companies such as Microsoft, Oracle, and Amazon, which should qualify for that exemption, though the rule’s remote access limits still apply to them.
While both Singapore and Malaysia have made some public moves against chip smuggling, Kurlantzick said he’s “more inclined” to believe the Singaporean government was taking the matter seriously. Malaysia, in contrast, “wasn’t really doing anything, and didn’t care,” he said. “The U.S. is insanely unpopular in Malaysia.”
Stopping Chinese companies from accessing chips in overseas data centers could be a problem for countries like Malaysia, which want to become data center hubs. “For Malaysia, the controls could be disastrous,” Kurlantzick said. “From what Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim sees, their biggest potential future industry is a data center and AI hub for Chinese companies.”
The U.S. is also trying to draw countries into its “Pax Silica” framework, an initiative to secure semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains that bypass China. Beijing has a competing framework, the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization; the U.S. is pushing countries to choose one or the other. (Trump is in Manila this week for the ASEAN Summit, where he’s expected to persuade Southeast Asian countries to join Pax Silica—and perhaps now answer some awkward questions about these expanded rules.)
Still, Kurlantzick thinks the U.S.’s lack of attention to the region will hold back efforts to get other countries on board. “The U.S. isn’t really offering Southeast Asian countries–or really anyone in Asia–much in return for their demands,” he said.
Does China care anymore?
The biggest barrier to chips entering China right now isn’t Washington, but Beijing. The Chinese government has largely withheld permission for its companies to import Nvidia chips, instead pushing them to tap domestic chips made by companies like Huawei. DeepSeek in particular has led the drive to get Chinese AI models to run well on Huawei’s Ascend processors.
“Export controls still matter,” Lind said, though she admitted they may matter less now. “China is already well on its way toward developing its own AI ecosystem; Huawei makes its own chips for training and running AI models, and a software platform (CANN) that’s an alternative to Nvidia’s CUDA ecosystem,” she said.
She’s paying more attention to “whether semiconductor manufacturing equipment continues to be restricted—whether China develops the capability to manufacture its own frontier chips,” Lind said. “The Trump administration continues to restrict SME exports, and will likely continue to.”
Still, Huawei’s Ascend processors are not as good as the best Nvidia AI processors, particularly when it comes to training models.
Before the BIS announced its rule on Monday, Dohmen suggested that if Chinese companies can’t access Nvidia chips overseas, the roughly 600,000 H200s that Reuters reported are gathering dust in Hong Kong look more attractive.
“Would the Chinese government be more willing to let those H200s flow into China?” she asked. “If there is certain significant demand for remote access, and that’s cut off, there may actually be more need for the H200s.”
It’s not yet clear that China can supply all the computing power its AI developers need, particularly if overseas access disappears. China “does not have the capacity at this point to meet that demand,” Dohmen said.





