A recent investigation has revealed how a Kremlin-linked payments company allegedly moved more than $6.9 billion through major international banks by exploiting gaps in compliance controls and using a large-scale document-forgery operation.
The reporting from the FT is said to be based on hundreds of thousands of internal files obtained from A7, a fintech group launched in late 2024 as a workaround after Russian lenders were cut off from the SWIFT messaging network following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
A7 was established with backing from Promsvyazbank, a state-owned bank closely tied to Russia’s defense sector, and Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor.
The company marketed itself as an alternative channel for Russian firms seeking to conduct cross-border trade.
According to the leaked records, A7 did not rely solely on novel payment technology.
Instead it used a network of front companies in jurisdictions including Kyrgyzstan, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong and Hungary.
These intermediaries opened accounts at banks still connected to SWIFT.
When compliance teams questioned transfers, A7 staff allegedly generated counterfeit invoices and supporting paperwork on an industrial scale.
Transaction descriptions and customs codes were routinely altered so that restricted goods appeared to be ordinary commercial items.The structure of SWIFT itself helped the scheme operate.
The system generally depends on the originating bank to verify its own customers rather than independently checking every beneficiary.
Once A7-linked entities cleared those initial controls, funds could move onward through correspondent banks.
The documents show substantial volumes reaching well-known institutions. Accounts at Standard Chartered in Hong Kong received about $1.1 billion from A7-connected entities between late 2024 and August 2025.
Seventeen entities holding accounts at First Abu Dhabi Bank sent more than $1.8 billion outbound.
Smaller but still significant sums reached clients of DBS in Hong Kong, Citigroup and Deutsche Bank.
A7-linked vehicles also used accounts at JPMorgan.
Some of the payments appear connected to purchases by Russian security services and military-related entities.
The files indicate that A7 maintained a roster of roughly 100 front companies whose purpose was to create a plausible paper trail and obscure the Russian origin of the funds.
Several banks named in the investigation said they take anti-money-laundering and sanctions obligations seriously.
First Abu Dhabi Bank stated it had already identified and closed the relevant accounts.
Other institutions declined to discuss individual cases but emphasized existing controls.
A7 and its principals have been designated by the United States, United Kingdom and European Union.
Despite those measures, the leaked material suggests the network continued to route large sums through the conventional banking system for many months by substituting forged documentation for genuine commercial activity.
The episode highlights persistent weaknesses in how global banks monitor correspondent relationships and trade-based transfers.
It also illustrates the difficulty of fully isolating a large economy from the international financial system when determined actors combine shell companies, document fabrication and access to SWIFT-connected institutions.
